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When Corporations Substitute 
for Adversarial Unions
Labour Markets and Human Resource 
Management at Magna
WAYNE LEWCHUK
DON WELLS1
The industrial relations system at Magna International is an 
example of an integrated, coherent, non-union human resource 
management strategy. It includes significant mechanisms of 
worker voice and conflict resolution as substitutes for union 
representation. Potential labour-management conflicts associated 
with Taylorized labour processes are often translated into group 
problem-solving. Redistributive conflicts are re-framed as mutual 
gains through profit-sharing. Corporate communications promote 
an ethos of competitiveness. Individualized pay and promotion 
schemes, segmented internal labour markets, and the exposure 
of individual plants to competitive pressures, promote cultures of 
labour cooperation in the pursuit of productivity gains. The success 
of this union avoidance model is situated in a context of the erosion 
of unionized labour relations, the disciplinary effects of precarious 
labour markets, and the vulnerability of workplaces to transnational 
competitive forces. Continued success is predicated on Magna’s 
ability to survive sectoral and macroeconomic restructuring forces 
which are, in large measure, beyond management’s control.
Magna International is the “most diversified automotive supplier in 
the world” with over 82,000 employees in 224 plants in 22 countries and 
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annual revenues exceeding $22 billion (Magna, 2006). In Canada, its 22,200 
employees and 61 plants make Magna the country’s largest auto sector 
employer (Magna, 2005a) and the fifth largest automotive firm in North 
America. Much of Magna’s success depends on a labour relations strategy 
that is almost entirely non-union. This ability to remain largely ‘union free’ 
is built around a human resource management strategy focussed on active 
employee cooperation.1 The strategy includes significant mechanisms of 
worker voice and conflict resolution that substitute for union functions of 
representation and grievance handling. To an important degree, conflicts 
over labour productivity and management control are turned into problems 
to be solved among workers at the level of work groups. Magna’s union 
avoidance strategy includes individualized monetary compensation, and 
promotion and job security rewards that are linked to each worker’s positive 
attitudes to productivity and quality goals.2 Plant level cultures of worker-
management reciprocity are nurtured in a decentralized corporate network 
in which each plant operates as a quasi-independent “profit centre.”
Union avoidance is reinforced by external labour markets.3 Magna 
locates most plants in semi-peripheral labour markets where wages and job 
security are poor, and living costs are moderate relative to major urban areas. 
Magna also recruits large numbers of immigrants. The result is a strong, 
coherent, sophisticated, non-union human resource management strategy 
that fits within the growing pattern of non-union workplace relations. 
As described by Katz and Darbishire (2000: 11), for example, this HRM 
pattern emphasizes corporate culture, extensive corporate communications 
systems, directed teams, above-average wages, contingent pay schemes, and 
individualized career development. At workplace level, these features are 
linked to mechanisms of union substitution integral to the emerging non-
union industrial relations system in the US, as described by Kochan, Katz 
and McKersie (1986: 47–80). At the macroeconomic level, these non-union 
trends are conditioned by the growing coerciveness of neoliberal markets 
and attendant increasing job competition among workers (McBride and 
Williams, 2001).
In exploring why the Taylorization of work at Magna has not led to 
unionization and the sort of worker resistance found in most large automobile 
plants in Canada, the US and elsewhere (Beynon, 1975; Humphrey, 1982; 
Jefferys, 1986; Graham, 1996; Wells, 1995, 1996) this paper raises a number 
1. For an early study of Magna, see Anderson and Holmes (1995). On labour-management 
cooperation in a team-based “entrepreneurial” culture, see Stewart (1989).
2. Magna’s strategy is consistent with findings in Foulkes’ study of human resource 
management systems in large US firms (Foulkes, 1980).
3. Cf. linkages between the growth of non-union industrial relations systems and labour 
market changes in the US (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986: 52–55).
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of implications for the future of unions. In the Magna model, workers look 
more to management than to unions or political organizations to provide 
a ‘haven in a heartless world.’ To the extent that variations on Magna’s 
model are becoming more typical, this suggests a decline of key features of 
labour-management relations that were central to the ‘making’ of post-war 
working class politics.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The findings stem mainly from research at two Dortec plants of Intier 
Automotive, one of three automotive divisions of Magna International.4
Dortec is a subsidiary of Intier, which has 24,100 employees in seventy-
four sites in North America, Brazil, Europe and Asia (Magna, 2006: 19). 
The analysis is based on the authors’ extensive direct observation of work 
relations, corporate documents, interviews with auto industry analysts 
familiar with Magna, interviews with plant and corporate-level Magna 
managers, and interviews with production workers. The employees who 
were interviewed were selected under the authors’ direction by managers 
using criteria specified by the authors, including varied seniority, gender, 
skill and jobs. This yielded a stratified cross-sectional sample of eighteen 
workers. While there may have been some management manipulation 
of this selection, the authors are confident the interviews were broadly 
representative of attitudes of many workers in the plant. This is supported 
by a separate set of interviews with six injured workers, laid off by Magna, 
who volunteered to be interviewed at a worker advocacy centre. Their view 
of work at Magna was consistent with that reported here. Questions for these 
semi-structured interviews were devised and administered by the authors. 
Workers were interviewed separately by one or both authors and were 
guaranteed that their responses would be confidential. Interviews typically 
lasted an hour. The authors did open-ended interviews with four government 
and private sector auto industry analysts, two corporate-level and five 
plant-level Magna managers. The authors observed work arrangements in 
three Magna plants, two at the complex described above and another in a 
different community.
WORKING AT MAGNA
The “campus” of the factory complex that is the focus of this study 
consists of a half dozen carefully landscaped brick structures surrounded 
by a large upscale housing estate. Inside one of these structures, over
4. The other divisions are Decoma International and Tesma International.
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400 people manufacture automotive latches, opening devices and door 
modules. The facility is composed of a stamping plant, an assembly hall, 
and a tool and die shop. The assembly hall is divided into dozens of self-
contained work areas, each set up to make one of the dozens of small 
components. A typical work area employs eight to ten people. The jobs 
themselves are carefully engineered cells. Tooling technology is creative but 
not cutting edge. There are no robots. Most workers are employed loading, 
assembling and unloading components on jigs and fixtures. The work is 
fast and repetitive. Cycle times are typically less than a minute, and the 
assembly jobs require little skill. At about $16.00 an hour, wages for most 
of the production workers are modest: about average for the parts sector, 
but about 40% less than pay for comparable work in a vehicle assembly 
plant (APMA, 2003).
Given this highly Taylorist labour process, the cooperative nature of 
workers’ relation to management is striking. An assembler: “I really like 
my job. The line that I am working now is my favourite line.” A press 
operator: “I like coming to my job. I enjoy what I do. . . . I enjoy the people. 
We have fun.” Another assembler: “I love doing well. Like I love keeping 
up.” A tool and die maker: “From what I see there’s a lot of pretty happy 
people here.” Several workers we spoke with regularly exceeded required 
effort norms. An assembler:
“Our quota [on another line] was 180 an hour and . . . we used to make like 
240 parts an hour, sometimes 270. Way out of quota and [workers] pushed, 
pushed, pushed. . . . It almost becomes like a competition . . . where you can 
just see if you can do more, more, more. . . . I still get it sometimes here when 
I’m on a machine where I’m by myself and there’s nobody after me. . . . You 
just go, go, go.”
Although none of those interviewed were ‘happy workers’ exhibiting 
profound fulfillment in their deskilled, routinized jobs, most reported 
surprising satisfaction with their work and an active commitment to Magna’s 
corporate goals. Much of the literature on cooperative labour relations 
focusses on ‘post Taylorist’ labour processes (Ross, 2003; Appelbaum et 
al., 2000; Zuboff, 1988; Adler, 1992) built around less standardized and 
less authoritarian forms of work organization. Nor does worker cooperation 
at Magna stem from upward-skilling socio-technical production systems 
found, for example, in some Swedish plants (Brulin and Nilsson, 1997; 
Bengtsson, 1999; Berggren, 1992). Nor is the Magna model built around 
the multi-skilling and small group problem-solving associated particularly 
with Toyota production systems in Japan (Koike, 1987; Cusumano, 1985). 
The remainder of this paper explores how Magna has gained the active 
cooperation of its workers and avoided unionisation, without radically 
changing the nature of work.
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THE MAGNA MODEL
Magna’s high commitment model has evolved over five decades, 
beginning at a small tool and die shop in 1957. As major auto assemblers 
increasingly outsourced production to components manufacturers, Magna 
diversified its production and design capacities to join the ranks of large 
first-tier suppliers. Magna expects sales to reach $50 billion within the next 
ten years. In Canada, Magna is now the largest auto employer with annual 
revenue second only to General Motors.
FIGURE 1
Canadian Employment by Company, 2005
GM For d Ch ry sle r M agn a
0
5 ,00 0
10 ,0 00
15 ,0 00
20 ,0 00
25 ,0 00
In contrast to ‘big factory’ Fordism, with its mass, centralized 
workforces, Magna employs its tens of thousands of workers in hundreds 
of plants, each with a few hundred workers, allowing Magna to incorporate 
elements of a paternalistic management strategy while magnifying the 
exposure of workers and local managers to competitive pressures.5 Magna’s 
plants are semi-autonomous and more directly exposed to market discipline 
than is the case in production units integrated into large plants. The 
corporate centre provides financial resources, a forum for exchanging ideas 
and developing best practices, and shapes company philosophy, including 
the organization of workplace culture. This combined centralization and 
decentralization captures synergies of small-firm networks.6 Strategically, 
5. The average plant employed 283 in 1997 and 366 in 2005 (Magna Annual Information 
Form, 1997–2006).
6. On benefits of auto related clusters, see Holmes et al. (2005). 
Source: Magna (2006); CAW 2005 Big Three Bargaining: Facts and Figures, July 
2005.
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the company is a single firm industrial district in which operating units 
take on features of small and medium-sized firms, as described by Sabel, 
citing Magna as “an extreme case in point” (1994: 122). Magna refers to 
this strategy as one of “functional and operational decentralization” (Magna, 
2006: 12).
MANAGEMENT’S OPEN DOOR
Magna’s HRM strategy shapes an ethos in which harder edges of 
management control are softened by a culture of worker-manager reciprocity. 
From job advertisements promoting it as a “Fair Enterprise Employer” to the 
widely displayed “Magna Employee Charter,” Magna brands itself as caring 
about its workers. This culture is fostered by an air of egalitarian informality 
in day-to-day shopfloor relations. Both plant managers and workers have 
an average age in the mid 30s, and this informality is, for many, part of a 
shared generational bond. In many production areas, women represent the 
majority of the workforce. A number of line leaders were women, but very 
few work in the trades.
Magna’s HRM strategy centres on worker voice mechanisms, corporate 
communications, and problem-solving work groups. Worker voice is 
channelled through a grievance system that substitutes for formal “due 
process” in unionized workplaces. Through its Open Door Policy, Magna 
encourages workers to articulate concerns not as collective grievances 
requiring worker resistance and higher level negotiation but as individual 
problems to be solved informally on the shop floor. Indicative of Magna’s 
success in this regard, workers we interviewed saw line leaders and 
supervisors as reasonably impartial adjudicators helping to deal with 
workers’ concerns. To avoid any escalation of conflict, management policy 
is to respond to any concern within 48 hours. A line leader explains:
As soon as a group of people start talking about an issue, the management 
actually starts to get on it real quick ... before it can start going through the 
whole issue. And then within 48 hours or something management will have a 
response for that group of people.
For some, Magna’s Open Door Policy is “like a union.” Others feel a 
union grievance procedure provides more protection because “at least they 
are there to back you up.... [At Magna] if you don’t get a bunch of people 
to back you up, you are just on your own.” A worker who had worked in 
a unionized plant explained that the union provided “more protection,” 
whereas at Magna “you don’t really have that much protection.” A line 
leader reported, for example, that although workers know they can use the 
Open Door Policy, they prefer not to. “I don’t know if they’re afraid to 
or they feel that if they do . . . there might be some kind of repercussion.” 
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And a worker suggested that if management “decides to get you on your 
attendance, that’s it. . . You’re out the door.” Legal consultants reported 
that a number of Magna workers have lost their jobs following work-related 
injuries.7 For others, however, including this tool and die maker, Magna’s 
procedure is still empowering but only for workers as individuals:
GM’s a unionized plant where you go through your Committeeman and every 
other process. Here . . . if my foreman has a problem with me or my supervisor 
does, I can go in that office and talk to him one on one, and I don’t need a 
third party involved. And we can fix it up pretty quickly.
Magna’s Open Door Policy also includes formal mechanisms. For 
example, any worker may raise concerns with the Employee Advocate, 
an hourly employed who is selected by management, but who can only 
be removed by at least half the voting workforce at periodic secret ballots 
(Magna, 2005b: 29). The Advocate seeks out workers’ concerns, provides 
management-sanctioned options, and sometimes accompanies workers to 
meetings with management. However, as a Magna manager clarified, the 
Advocate is “not to represent” but to “guide and assist where needed” rather 
than to “take on the lawyer role.” Expressing a common attitude among 
workers, an assembler explained:
[The Advocate is] a guy from the floor. We’ve worked with him before, and 
any issue you have, you can go to him. . . . And you can tell him your problem 
and he’s coming back to you in a few hours or a few days, depending on how 
big is your problem. He is a very nice guy. I had a very good experience with 
him.
Workers may also take unresolved grievances to Magna’s Fairness 
Committee, composed of managers and employees elected by their peers. 
“Our whole reasoning behind the Fairness Committee and the Employee 
Advocate,” explained an HR manager, “is to sort of bridge that . . . missing 
link between employees and management, and to help foster the Open Door 
Policy.” Like the Employee Advocate, Fairness Committee members may 
accompany workers to meetings with management, but do not speak for 
them. A worker who served on a Fairness Committee explained that the 
Committee learned “how to make people understand.”
A worker who is still not satisfied may appeal to corporate-level 
management by calling a “Hotline,” but this is rarely used. Plant managers 
prefer employees to “have enough confidence in our Management Team 
to give us a chance to solve the problem first.” (Intier Automotive, n.d.). 
Indeed, all the steps in Magna’s Open Door Policy beyond first line 
supervision are rarely used, mainly because workers usually resolve 
7. Personal communication, April 2005.
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job issues (e.g., job rotation, minor changes in job sequences, overtime 
allocation, etc.) themselves.
The key to workers’ resolving most job issues lies in Magna’s work 
group organization. Varying in size from three to eighteen or more, work 
groups are smaller than supervisory zones or production departments in 
most Big Three assembly plants, and thus easier to manage. Their size also 
contributes to a more personal relation between line leaders and workers, 
and between front line supervisors and workers. An assembler reported:
“we all kind of kick in together and help each other. . . . It’s almost like a 
little family.” An assembler:
We rotate our job every hour, so I know all sixteen, seventeen jobs on that line, 
and we also know everybody. We know each other, we know how we work, 
we know where the bottleneck[s] of the line [are], and when I have extra time 
I know where I should help out.
Work groups meet frequently. A line leader:
We meet ... any time we have an issue. Like, I ask them every day, ‘How can 
we improve things?,’ ‘How can we make things better?’... Just the line itself 
meets every day and we sort of talk about ways to improve things.
For the most part, work groups solve narrow problems related to 
productivity within their areas, and then make recommendations to 
management. Typical issues involve workers’ concerns about floor mats 
in the area and the pencils they use. Line leaders and supervisors play 
major roles in working out problems through work group consensus. 
Supervisors “supervise like a friend” and are “easy to talk to,” an assembler 
points out. The line leader, who has a day-to-day relation to the workers, 
is a communicator and mediator, not an order-giver. Through leaders, 
management inserts supervisory roles into the work groups, blurs the line 
between management and worker, and provides a significant buffer to 
potential resistance, changing potential labour-management conflicts into 
problems workers solve in relation to each other.
Given the limited role of seniority at Magna, workers often use personal 
relations with supervisors to make individual gains, such as better access to 
training and job postings, preferred vacation schedules, and hiring of friends 
and family members. Supervisors typically suggest training for particular 
workers, and this can play a major role in promotions. Supervisors and 
line leaders favour “people with positive attitudes,” reported a line leader. 
Magna’s less bureaucratic employee relations system makes it easier 
for managers to reward employees they consider meritorious. This is an 
important basis of informal reciprocal manager-worker obligations. “I come 
in and I’ll give [the supervisor] a fair day’s work, so he’ll treat me with 
respect,” explained a tool and die maker. “That comes back where I’ll ask 
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[the supervisor] to do something, [the supervisor will] do it.” At the same 
time, it is recognized that without a union these reciprocal relations are based 
on highly unequal power: [elsewhere] “a lot of people hide behind the union. 
That’s their safety barrier. In here you can’t get away with that [because] 
basically if you don’t want to do the job, okay, guess what? You’re fired.” 
Some workers view this inequality in power positively as a way to ensure 
that workers follow management directives, thus ensuring profits which 
benefit individual workers through Magna’s profit sharing plan.
Another mechanism of worker voice is Magna’s Quality of Work 
Life Survey, which is designed to monitor how well local management
fulfills Magna’s Employee’s Charter. The Charter outlines the firm’s 
“operating philosophy” based on “fairness and concern for people.” 
Common questions allow management to benchmark quality-of-work-life 
responses across Magna plants. When the survey discloses significant 
problems, plant managers set up Quality of Work Life Action Teams and 
Employee Focus Groups to develop action plans. Workers and managers 
discuss the survey results and action plans at plant, department and work 
group meetings.
CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS
At Magna, mechanisms of worker voice overlap with internal corporate 
communications. Throughout the plants there are Communication Centres 
that include employee suggestion boxes and information about job postings, 
company stock values, plant performance, company events and other 
activities. During weekly Department Meetings and daily Line Meetings, 
line leaders and supervisors report on “how we’re doing, if they’re making 
money, if there’s new lines starting. . . . [They] let you know everything 
about the business,” says an assembler. Based on these discussions, line 
leaders make weekly reports that workers read before the reports go to 
management. “It’s kind of like voting,” a line leader explains. “We read 
[the report] with the group ... If they agree with it, then everyone has to start 
following it.” Sometimes managers attend the line meetings to reinforce 
compliance. One manager brings pizza to line meetings when work groups 
meet their quotas. At monthly Plant Meetings managers tell workers “if 
we’re doing well or we’re on the low side,” a production worker reports. 
Workers ask questions and managers “give us whatever information they 
have.” A line leader: “They show us slides of what our quality percentage 
was for the month, and what our productive measures were for the month, 
and everything else about it.”
Sometimes, when business is going less well, management’s message 
to the workers can be negative. For example, management has talked about 
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adverse market conditions requiring the firm to reduce fringe benefits. 
Usually, however, the message is one of competitive success in which 
everyone has played an important role. A tool and die maker:
Every meeting they’re always thanking us for doing a good job, and always. . .
trying to make, you know, a little more effort. They don’t come out and say 
‘work harder,’ or whatever. They say ‘fantastic job.’. . .that’s the best way to 
motivate someone to do a good job. . . . [managers] always credit everyone in 
the monthly meetings. Everyone as a whole is making this happen.
There are raffles at the meetings and workers who have perfect 
attendance get chances to go on weekend retreats. Every month, management 
invites workers with birthdays that month to Coffee Chats where managers 
inform them about business activities, such as new contracts. The Plant 
Meetings and Birth Month Meetings bring together a cross-section of the 
plant employees including production, skill trades, supervision, technical 
workers and managers, reinforcing plant-wide identities rather than just 
work group, departmental and skill-based identities.
Management also uses training as corporate communication. Much 
training centres on production quality, such as training work groups in 
introductory Six Sigma (a system of quality management that uses statistical 
measures to orient employees to efficiency improvements) and ‘soft skills’ 
to help workers achieve quality and productivity goals in cooperation with 
others. Management also uses sports to increase its bonding with employees. 
Magna has a park with water sports and other facilities for employees and 
their families. There are also numerous employee events, including an 
annual ‘hoe down’ at corporate headquarters, and tickets for employees to 
attend cultural events.
SENIORITY RIGHTS AND MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Magna workers have limited formal contractual rights. Most 
entitlements are customary and subject to management discretion. This 
includes seniority rights. At Magna, seniority is a factor in promotions 
only where two candidates are deemed equally qualified by management. 
Promotion requires good work records and cooperative attitudes. According 
to the employee handbook, “promotion means giving a broader service 
and a greater commitment.” Seniority is more important in lateral transfers 
(e.g., to another shift), but those with discipline infractions or whose work 
is deemed unsatisfactory are ineligible. Seniority has little bearing on job 
transfers to other Magna plants. Finding a new job within the Magna system 
largely depends on managerial discretion.
This limited role for seniority provides management with far more 
flexibility than it would enjoy in most unionized plants. Nevertheless, to 
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the extent that seniority is a residual factor in such decisions, employees 
sense a degree of due process and protection from discrimination. While 
seniority has, at best, a minor role in the employment security of permanent 
workers, those we interviewed felt considerable security. This partly reflects 
the job security buffer of temporary workers in these plants. Job security 
has also been reinforced for the past decade or so by growing employment 
at these plants and at Magna as a whole. This security underpins the 
cooperation many workers give to management, particularly in promoting 
job-eliminating improvements. Especially for many immigrant and female 
workers who face disproportionate inequalities in external labour markets, 
this level of job security is likely to be especially powerful in shaping their 
active cooperation with management.
In effect, Magna combines some job security advantages of a large 
firm with paternalistic, personalized labour relations that are possible in
smaller plants. In particular, individual rewards for achieving management 
goals are much greater than in most unionized plants. Individual job security 
and job mobility inside the plants promote an ethos of individual success 
that masks the underlying collective inequalities of labour-management 
relations. Workers who want to ‘get ahead’ have potential advantages, 
and some feel that seniority rights protect workers who do not work very 
hard, thus dragging down profitability and reducing overall employment 
security.
CONSULTATIVE WORK RESTRUCTURING
Labour-management consultation mechanisms focussed on work 
restructuring lie at the intersection between corporate communications and 
worker voice. While work groups focus on minor issues, major changes are 
usually designed by cross-functional teams made up mainly of engineers, 
other technical personnel and managers. A line leader explained:
When it comes to actually making changes on the line, or rearranging the line, 
or how things should be done, it’s all the management that does that. I mean we 
can put in suggestions and comments and stuff about how we think it should 
be, but then management has to go through the whole process of looking it 
over, seeing how feasible it is.
Management’s unilateralism, an assembler explained, is based on apparent 
technical imperatives:
Even if people don’t like [changes in the labour process], sometimes it’s like 
a law. They can’t [change it]. [Managers] say ‘sorry people, but we can’t do 
it.’ They said ‘there are the rules.’ They have to follow some interests from 
the [technical design] table to the machine.
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A line leader reported that managers “just come in and say ok, this is the 
way the line is. Deal with it.” “If you are not management,” he’s noticed 
“you won’t get a hell of a lot done.”
Such consultation is not without contradictions. Changes are often about 
making work faster and adding tasks to jobs. Some changes entail job 
elimination. An engineer explained that he is responsible for introducing 
automation to eliminate jobs by calculating the cost of machines compared 
to wage and benefit costs. When engineers “come out with a stopwatch, 
holy smokes, the line slows down cuz they know we’re timing them to see 
where we can make improvement and they feel threatened.” When changes 
mean work intensification, “that does really make us mad,” a line leader 
explained.
Even when worker consultation about job changes entails little 
productivity gain, it may foster worker internalization of management’s 
enthusiasm for increased productivity. Alignment of one’s identity to the 
attainment of common goals with other workers partly immunizes many 
workers against the discontents of heavy workloads and repetitive labour. 
Management claims employees enjoy “an appropriate level of autonomy 
and responsibility so they consider each operation as though it were their 
own business.”8
CARROTS AND STICKS
Communication, worker voice and consultation policies help defuse 
labour-management conflicts while encouraging workers to consider 
themselves key players in Magna’s success. Also significant in promoting 
such unitarist industrial relations is the company’s compensation strategy. 
Wages are modest for the sector, about average for the parts sector but about 
40% lower for assemblers and 15% lower for skilled categories compared 
to Big Three assembly plants. Benefits are also much lower than in Big 
Three plants. Work shift premiums at the Big Three, for example, are two 
to four times those at Magna, and there are substantial differences in paid 
time off, including holidays and vacations.9
Despite compensation inequalities, there is a general sense that Magna 
wages are “good . . . for what I do.” In the context of external labour markets 
where many workers receive few if any benefits, Magna workers value their 
8. www.intier.com/WorkingIntier/Working_Intier.html. 
9. After one year, Magna employees received 192 hours of paid time off per year compared 
to 284 hours at GM; after ten years the ratio is 272:360 in favour of GM; after 25 years 
it is 312:420 (Intier Automotive, n.d; CAW-GM Master Agreement, 2002). 
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benefits. A former GM skilled trades worker said his pay was less than 
two-thirds of his GM wage, but that he was satisfied with his wages, in
part because he is treated well at Magna whereas at “GM you’re a
number.” When workers talk about wages and benefits at Magna, they often 
compare them to worse wages and benefits at previous jobs. Acceptance of 
modest wages is also explained by an internal labour market that is divided 
between permanent full-time workers and a tier of temporary workers 
comprising up to a quarter of the workforce. New hires start as temporary 
workers with lower wages and without profit-sharing or pensions. They 
endure probations of several months to years before managers select some 
for permanent jobs. Temporary workers are a reminder to permanent 
workers about how fortunate they are, particularly since many permanent 
workers were once temporaries.
The pay system stresses contingent components that reflect individual 
worker cooperation and the vagaries of financial markets. Annual pay 
increases, profit shares and benefit coverage are linked to overall firm 
performance. Under the “pay-for-performance system,” each worker’s 
annual pay increase depends on annual performance reviews by supervisors. 
Criteria include productivity, quality, attendance, safety and housekeeping, 
job knowledge and reliability, and criteria such as “adaptability,” 
“communication,” and “decision making” (Intier Automotive, n.d). Workers 
who do not meet management’s expectations receive only half the pay 
increase, and are eligible to receive the rest only if their performance 
improves. Meeting performance criteria in any year triggers a return to 
the full wage level. An assembler feels these evaluations are “like getting 
a report card.”
[The supervisor will] say ‘you’re a good worker. You work safely.’ And then 
she’ll talk about my attendance and then she’ll say that I help other people 
and I like to save time. Like, if my line is down, I like to be, you know, like 
doing something else, not just standing there. You know, [supervisors] always 
let us know how we’re doing.
There are significant individual incentives for workers whose skills 
are especially needed or whose efforts are exemplary. Those with perfect 
attendance participate in monthly draws to win financial bonuses or 
additional time off. At some plants, management gives each full-time 
permanent worker an annual bonus of perhaps a few hundred dollars based 
on local production targets. Magna presents workers with Service Awards to 
recognize “long service and loyalty” (Intier Automotive, n.d.: 20). Workers 
earn “reward points” and prizes for making suggestions accepted by 
management. Although the scale of most workers’ suggestions limits their 
value for cost cutting and productivity improvements, such participation is 
consistent with internalizing ‘continuous improvement’ goals.
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SHARING THE PROFIT PIE
Perhaps the most effective mechanism encouraging workers to promote 
management goals is the Deferred Profit Sharing Plan. Magna distributes 
10% of annual pretax profits to employees in the form of company shares 
that are held in individual trust accounts. Most employees are not allowed 
to make withdrawals from these accounts for at least ten years. An optional 
Defined Benefit Pension Plan, which provides a fixed pension at age 65, 
includes a lower level of profit-sharing. Most employees, reportedly over 
90%, choose the Deferred Profit Sharing Plan. After choosing an option, 
a worker may not make a different choice. Since 2005, Magna has closed 
the defined benefit option to new employees (Magna, 2006: 27).
Magna’s Employee Handbook urges employees to “help the profit 
sharing plan by being aware of how you affect the profit of your Company . 
. . Teamwork makes it happen!” Since Magna share values have historically 
been volatile, profit sharing constantly reminds workers of the competitive 
world in which the company operates. The deferred aspect of the profit 
sharing plan means the ultimate value of current profits will depend on 
the firm’s long term performance, thus further aligning worker interests 
with company success. In contrast to pension plans where the employer 
contribution is viewed as a drain on corporate capital, deferred profits 
invested in Magna shares are a source of corporate capital.
About 60% of employees also participate in a Group Registered 
Retirement Savings Program which allows employees to allocate a 
percentage of their earnings to the plan. For those not opting for the fixed 
pension, Magna partially matches the employee contributions. There is 
no match for employees participating in the fixed pension. Since few opt 
for the fixed pension, most rely on profit-sharing as their main source of 
retirement income. Indeed, some have voluntarily purchased thousands of 
dollars of the firm’s shares over and above the shares they already hold 
through the profit sharing plan, thereby increasing their dependence on 
Magna’s success. After years of company growth, this strategy has paid off, 
but lack of diversification makes it a risky financial strategy (as evidenced 
by a 30% fall in Magna’s share price over two years since 2004).
These investments in company equity are succeeding in aligning 
workers’ job efforts to corporate profitability. While engineers and managers 
tended not to see a strong link between their work and company profits, 
most production workers felt there were links between how they worked 
and Magna’s stock values. A production worker said when some workers 
damage tools or cause waste in production, other workers say “Look it, that’s 
coming out of my pocket, you idiot!” This can cause “heated discussions” 
among workers. A line leader said she tried to keep quality high so parts 
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wouldn’t be rejected. She felt this meant corporate profits would be higher 
and there would be more profits for her to share. A line leader considers 
himself a “small owner” of Magna because of the profit sharing plan. His 
work affects the company’s stock price because “if it costs more to make 
the part, we’re gonna lose.” Another line leader suggested:
The people [in the plants] ... like to make sure [quality is high] ... because 
[otherwise] it will look bad on us and it will look bad on the business and we 
might lose business over this... If you lose this, then they know they won’t 
have a job....like they’ll be reading a newspaper and they’ll [read] that Ford’s 
having a lot of rejects or that the stocks have gone up. Again, we do talk about 
that, because when it comes to that type of stuff it sort of has to do with job 
security and how much money you are going to make.
Another line leader: “So everyone’s kind of made up to be ‘ok, let’s 
give [management] what they want. This way [with profit sharing etc.] no 
one’s complaining. . . . It’s kinda like ‘let’s give ‘em what they want.’”
In other cases, however, some have been less willing to cooperate with 
management goals. A skilled worker explained that he might “not feel that 
management per se is necessarily on our team but as a group we tend to 
stick together and that’s what I think is the team.” In a workload dispute, 
the workers in his group “voiced their opinions” but most did not want to 
complain to management, fearing they would “upset management or whatever, 
and then have it turn around and come back at them.” In extreme cases, work 
groups have resisted management with some success. One worker recalled an 
episode where skilled workers felt management had been unfair to an injured 
worker in their work group. When they threatened to down tools, managers 
quickly resolved the crisis to the work group’s satisfaction.
For the most part, Magna’s culture precludes such resistance through 
a web of workplace dependency. Management control centres on the 
interdependent functioning of specialized roles: engineers, quality control, 
human resources, plant managers, assemblers, tool and die makers, and 
supervisors. These must function together if plants are to succeed in the 
competition for contracts. This interdependence signifies neither equality 
nor complete unity. Workers have a sense of an “us” and management 
as “them,” but the differences constitute an essentially unitarist labour-
management relations system in which almost everyone is substantially 
oriented toward common productivity and profit goals. “We’re all part of a 
group to achieve the same goal, right?,” a line leader explains. “I look at the 
whole plant as being one team. Because, I mean, even if, say, one line down 
at the back screws up, and stuff like that, it affects all of us.” Moreover, 
there appears to be a general sense among permanent production workers 
that plant management is, with some exceptions, ‘fair,’ and that reciprocal 
obligations in the Magna Charter are being fulfilled, more or less.
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LABOUR MARKET DISCIPLINE
The active consent of many of these workers to management goals and 
their attitudes to unions are also linked to their work biographies. Many 
came to Magna after working in peripheral labour markets: jobs at farms, 
restaurants and convenience stores, often in rural areas and economically 
depressed regions. Many are women without technical credentials, and 
many are new immigrants from low labour standard areas in Southern and 
Eastern Europe and Asia. One of these immigrants captured the benefits 
that hiring such immigrants has for Magna.
I came from Hong Kong. I never saw this policy here that we have a hotline 
to complain . . . that never happen in Hong Kong. . . . Wow! This is why I like 
this company. . . . This is why I think I have something, I have a very good 
support on job security here and I believe that people have to work hard in 
order to get what they want.
Most had no experience of collective gains through labour militancy and 
solidarity in unionized workplaces.
Internal and external labour markets operate as carrot and stick. Magna’s 
‘carrot’ is that, based on two incomes, many of its permanent workers earn 
a ‘family wage,’ own a home and have a reasonable level of job security 
inside these plants. The ‘stick’ lies outside. While wages inside the plants 
are lower than those in core labour markets, such as auto assembly, they are 
higher than wages in peripheral labour markets outside the plants. Recent 
external labour market trends are reinforcing their disciplinary effects. From 
1989–2001, those in the bottom 60% of family market income in Canada 
experienced declining market income.10 Meanwhile, the share of employees 
in precarious employment increased by a third (Vosko, 2006: 22).
Magna also benefits from hiring through family referrals. Many workers 
we interviewed had relatives working at the same plant. Use of family 
referrals, particularly from ethnic labour pools, contributes to company 
loyalty and subjects workers to group discipline. There are two and three 
generations of some of the families and there may be fifteen or twenty 
members of a family working at a plant. Magna’s “family” is a “family” 
of families. A line leader:
I’ve never seen a place with so many family members all in one place. And 
you look at our plant floor and stuff and you’ve got cousins and nephews and 
uncles and aunts and brothers and sisters and wives and fathers. . . . it really 
makes me laugh sometimes. You go talk to this one person and they say, ‘By 
the way, this is my sister so-and- so and this is my aunt so-and-so.’
10. Statistics Canada: Income in Canada, CD-ROM, Table T802. 
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An immigrant assembler:
If you are new here in Canada, your English is not very strong. Even if you go 
for interview, you can be an excellent specialist, but if you don’t know English, 
nobody is going to give you the job. In most cases I think this [hiring through 
ethnic networks] is working.
Magna also recruits skilled workers from low labour standard countries, 
and many of these skills have limited transferability. For example, Magna 
recruited many white skilled trades workers who left South Africa after the 
apartheid regime fell. In engineering, as well, there has been heavy reliance 
on non-native-born recruits and internal recruitment. Many do not have the 
same level of formal qualifications that similarly skilled workers have in 
Big Three assembly plants. An estimated one quarter of these plants’ skilled 
trades workers come from the shop floor through internal recruitment and 
training, much of which is based on European standards that are not widely 
recognized in Canada. An estimated half of the positions in engineering are 
filled by less professionally credentialed employees who worked their way 
up. Most supervisors come from the ranks of production workers and tend 
to have fewer formal skills than those recruited externally. Magna provides 
extensive training in areas including technical skills, apprenticeships, human 
resource management and supervision.
UNION AVOIDANCE AND LABOUR-MANAGEMENT 
COOPERATION
We have sought to explain how, despite highly Taylorized labour 
processes, Magna’s HRM model has, with few exceptions, not only 
precluded unionization and contained worker resistance but also fostered 
surprising labour cooperation with corporate competitiveness goals. 
Magna’s strategy combines ‘soft’ management techniques and an ethos of 
labour-management reciprocity and interdependence, together with rewards 
that are contingent on worker cooperation. Taylorist alienation, which might 
otherwise promote unionization, is assuaged by modest extrinsic rewards 
and high levels of cohesion. Union avoidance is embedded in a strategy of 
what could be called “unite and rule” that eschews exploitation of workplace 
divisions based on skill, ethnicity and gender. Cementing this cohesion is 
an ethic of cooperation among workers and between workers and managers, 
framed by Magna as an “employee entrepreneurial culture.”
As noted, Magna’s Open Door Policy includes a grievance system that 
integrates elements of worker voice and representation, and provides a sense 
of fairness. Magna’s success at avoiding the kind of labour-management 
adversarialism that normally underlies unionization in Canada, the US and 
elsewhere, is indicated by the fact that most issues are resolved by work 
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groups and supervisors as ‘problems’ before they become ‘grievances.’ 
Legitimation of managerial goals is further inculcated by communication 
systems that encourage active employee cooperation to achieve Magna’s 
competitiveness requirements, and hence greater job security and 
remuneration. These cultural and organizational dimensions of union 
avoidance are complemented by important material inducements including 
remuneration via pay-for-performance systems, individual and small group 
bonuses, and collective incentives, notably via profit sharing.
Internal and external labour markets strongly support this union-
avoiding HRM strategy. The main internal factor is the large tier of 
temporary labour in the plant which provides Magna with numerical 
flexibility, and permanent workers with a buffer against layoffs. Key 
external factors are the disciplinary effects of the vulnerability of small 
plants to competitive market pressures, and workers’ experience of lower 
paid, ‘bad’ jobs in external labour markets, both foreign and domestic. To 
an important degree, this external labour market coercion substitutes for 
management coercion in eliciting worker cooperation by masking much of 
the power relation between managers and workers, transforming it into the 
impersonal, naturalized discipline of ‘competitive’ forces.
The result has been the creation of work-group and plant-level identities 
that are strongly congruent with management productivity objectives
and inconsistent with union adversarialism that might contradict these 
objectives. In contrast to a union consciousness built in important part 
around a competitive division between profits and wages, in this model 
corporate profitability goals do not appear as a zero-sum contest with 
worker interests in higher remuneration and better working conditions. 
Worker cooperation is understood as a ‘common sense’ condition of mutual 
economic survival rather than as an antagonistic, mutable power relation. 
Workers who internalize Magna’s work ethos expect to receive “fair” 
treatment and respect from management, and many believe management 
has honoured this reciprocal relation. Magna’s competitive success has 
lent legitimacy not only to particular managers but also to the norms of 
cooperation that characterize its workplace culture. Competitive success has 
sustained Magna’s ability to distribute the material and security benefits 
stemming from its culture of reciprocal obligations between hard working 
managers and hard working workers.
At a societal level, much of the explanation for such labour-
management cooperation is found in the decline of the post World War 
II class compromise that legitimated and stabilized unions that helped 
to limit worker resistance through improved wages and benefits. Stable 
union-based industrial relations were supplemented through state activism. 
The embedded liberalism of social safety nets and the moderating effects 
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of counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary measures provided an important 
degree of socio-economic protection for many workers. The compromises 
in the workplace and in society provided politically constructed havens for 
many workers.11
For over two decades, unionized labour relations models have eroded as 
the Canadian economy has become more open to international competitive 
pressures, particularly through trade liberalization, state deregulation and 
the liberalization of capital flows. Declining private sector union density, 
and major recessions in the 1980s and 1990s are important factors in the 
increasing exposure of larger numbers of workers to harsh labour markets. 
Labour markets have become more unequal and fractured as “good jobs” 
have declined and “non standard” part time, impermanent, and other 
contingent employment has increased (Wells, 1997; Vosko, 2006). This has 
been assisted by erosion of the social wage (most notably unemployment 
insurance, see McBride, 1992) and of labour rights and standards (Panitch 
and Swartz, 2003). In this context, workers’ capacities to improve their pay 
and working conditions through their own usually union-based collective 
resistance have been thwarted by pressures well beyond plant-level labour-
management relations. The increasing vulnerability of many plants to 
competitive forces has helped to deprive workers and their unions not only 
of collective leverage but also of the sense of opposition to profit goals that 
would be needed to contest Taylorized job structures. Industrial politics 
has become less focussed on union-centred adversarial worker-employer 
relations and more on “the ‘rational’ tyranny of capital mobility over the 
collective worker” (Burawoy, 1985: 150). As a result, industrial politics 
and its prime manifestation, adversarial unionism, tends to be subsumed 
by market competition.
This dismantling of the unionism-legitimating postwar accord, and the 
weakening of the national economic autonomy on which it was predicated, 
has opened a new phase of corporate welfarism and company unionism 
(Jacoby, 1997). As Jacoby has argued, corporate welfare capitalism did not 
die out in the 1930s Depression but rather adapted to become a significant 
industrial relations current based on new forms of employee involvement 
and remuneration in non union workplaces (Jacoby, 1997). Magna is one 
model of this return to the corporate manor for “good workers.” The Open 
Door Policy and other mechanisms of conflict resolution are similar to 
those promoted by the welfare capitalist movement of the early to mid 
20th century (Nelson, 1975; Wells, 1995). The Magna model substitutes 
managerial persuasion and cooptation for coercion, informal relations for 
11. These protections were disproportionately enjoyed by unionized, male, “white” 
workers.
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formal labour-management relations, and individualized remuneration for 
more collective compensation.
The central problem this model poses for labour politics is the location 
of power: the main constraints increasingly shaping worker subordination 
in many workplaces are transnational competitive forces. These constraints 
(e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement, the World Trade 
Organization, and a plethora of bilateral trade arrangements) are impossible 
to address effectively at the workplace level. As an example of hyper-
decentralization of industrial relations to the plant level, the Magna model 
is both a symptom and cause of the erosion of labour politics. The roots of 
this decentralization of industrial relations to the level of workplace relations 
were present in the postwar accord itself, which was built around a multitude 
of local collective agreements, and was largely restricted to highly unionized 
core labour markets. The unravelling of the accord has reinforced this union 
decentralization and provided stimulus for the Magna model.
The consequences of such a model for labour politics and unionism 
are significant. When workers’ identities are almost exclusively at the 
level of their firms, workplaces, and work groups, there is a corresponding 
diminution of a sense of their collective interests as workers in particular 
industries (the basis of industrial unionism) and as a class (the basis of social 
democratic and other forms of labour politics). As capital becomes more 
concentrated, and labour becomes more fragmented, the power imbalance 
between the two tends to grow. Marx was certainly correct about the 
tendencies toward increasing concentration of capital, but he did not foresee 
that tendencies toward the concentration of capital would be associated 
with such decentralization of production. This decentralization contradicts 
expectation that the large scale massing of workers in interdependent 
production processes would be necessary for effective worker mobilization 
of unions, social movements and political parties.
Renewal of unionism, particularly more adversarial forms of unionism, 
cannot take place only at the level of the workplace or individual firm 
because, in the context of contemporary labour market restructuring, this 
is where much of the logic of partnership is generated. Many worker 
accommodations with management that are taking place in both union and 
non-union workplaces reflect major changes in the balance of class forces 
beyond the workplace and the firm, which powerfully condition the turn 
toward more cooperative unionism and to non-union models at the level 
of the workplace.
These same forces can also provide conditions for the potential rise 
of a new phase of labour militancy and the renewal of more adversarial 
forms of unionism. The increasingly de-regulated nature of many aspects 
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of market competition which exposes firms to increasing competition also 
exposes workers to extreme labour market precariousness. Magna’s success 
at union avoidance is highly dependent on its ability to provide a certain 
degree of security and remuneration. This hinges in important part on the 
firm’s ability to remain competitive, which among other things depends 
in turn on macro-level political and economic conditions that are well 
beyond corporate control. In this context, the previous phase of welfare 
capitalism may prove instructive. According to historian David Brody, 
the demise of early twentieth century welfare capitalism in the US came 
less from contradictions at workplace and company levels and more from 
the “extraordinary turn in the business cycle” that generated the 1930s 
depression (Brody, 1968). Similarly, historian Stuart Brandes argues that 
although workers’ responses to welfare capitalism were more mixed, it 
was the Depression that “terminated the movement” as “welfare companies 
drew their belts ever tighter and reduced or eliminated expenditures on a 
variety of welfare activities” (Brandes, 1984: 142). Absent evidence that 
‘boom and bust’ tendencies of markets are abating, it is unreasonable to 
expect that major recessions can be avoided indefinitely. As in the 1930s, 
this can generate a new impetus for the development of working class 
political strategies.
Even short of a major downturn in the economy, new working class 
political strategies might emerge at Magna. Currently, workers’ vision of 
what is possible at Magna is very much controlled by management. A clear 
articulation of an alternative vision, one that offered workers security based 
on years of service, empowerment based on formalized agreements, and a 
pension plan less vulnerable to Magna’s continued success might resonate 
with a large number of workers. This might be particularly so given the 
Magna model presupposes continuing outsourcing from largely unionized 
assembly plants and continued success in the highly competitive parts 
sector. In a context where this cannot be assured, it is likely that the job 
security and wage levels of permanent workers would be endangered, and 
the high-risk nature of the deferred profit sharing plan would be exposed. 
In such a scenario, with its profit margins being squeezed at a time when 
retirements loom for larger proportions of its workforce, it may become 
difficult for Magna to respond to employee demands for security. The lack 
of seniority and transfer rights between plants could become sources of 
labour-management conflict. Magna might be hard pressed to respond to the 
needs of an aging workforce, such as more light duty jobs before retirement 
and reasonable income after retirement. When management is less able to 
respond to worker demands, mechanisms of worker voice that are central 
to the Magna model may also become vulnerable. How, for example, 
would management be able to make the Worker Advocate system work 
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under such conditions? It is logical to expect that such contradictions could 
weaken some of the pillars of labour-management reciprocity that have 
been the foundation of workers’ cooperation with, and active dedication 
to, productivity and quality improvements. All of these suggest a potential 
undermining of the preconditions for union avoidance, particularly given 
management’s reliance on highly Taylorized labour processes. When 
even the most stable plant-level industrial relations models provide only 
temporary havens for workers, prospects for renewal of unionism cannot 
be gainsaid.
Thus, after two decades of neo-liberal market restructuring in Canada 
and the US, and largely unsuccessful attempts by unions to organize Magna 
plants, both the United Auto Workers and the Canadian Auto Workers 
are currently engaged in management-initiated discussions to unionize 
Magna plants. This raises questions concerning management’s view of the 
sustainability of its HRM model. It may also point to the changing nature 
of union-management relations as unions become more directly involved 
in promoting the competitiveness of firms with which they bargain.
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RÉSUMÉ
Quand les entreprises se substituent au syndicalisme d’opposition : 
le marché du travail et la gestion des ressources humaines chez 
Magna
Magna International, avec un chiffre d’affaires de 22 milliards de 
dollars, passe pour le fournisseur le plus diversifié au monde dans l’industrie 
de l’automobile et emploie 82 000 personnes dans 224 usines, réparties dans 
21 pays. Au Canada, avec ses 22 000 employés dans 61 usines, Magna est 
l’employeur le plus important dans le secteur de l’automobile. Son succès 
repose en grande partie sur sa stratégie de relations du travail, qui demeure 
presque totalement sans syndicat. Son habileté à tenir le syndicalisme à 
distance réside dans son modèle de gestion des ressources humaines, qui 
comprend des mécanismes d’expression des salariés et de solution de conflit, 
jouant un rôle de substitut aux fonctions syndicales de représentation et 
de règlement des griefs. Jusqu’à un important degré, les désaccords sur 
la productivité du travail et du contrôle managérial sont transformés en 
problèmes susceptibles d’être résolus entre les travailleurs. Le modèle 
de Magna inclut une politique de rétribution en termes de compensation 
monétaire, de promotion et de sécurité d’emploi, qui prend en compte les 
attitudes positives des travailleurs à l’endroit des objectifs de productivité 
et de qualité. Les cultures de réciprocité patronale-syndicale dans les 
usines sont enrichies par un réseau corporatif décentralisé, où chaque usine 
fonctionne comme un « centre de profit » quasi indépendant.
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Au Canada, Magna établit ses usines dans des marchés du travail semi-
périphériques, où les salaires et la sécurité d’emploi sont faibles et où le coût 
de la vie est raisonnable quand on le compare à celui des régions urbaines. 
Il faut ajouter que cette entreprise recrute un grand nombre d’immigrants. 
Ces politiques de marché du travail ont contribué à l’élaboration d’un 
modèle sans syndicat de gestion des ressources humaines fort, cohérent, 
compliqué. C’est là un modèle qui cadre bien avec le type actuel de relations 
en l’absence de syndicat et qui prend de l’ampleur en mettant l’accent sur 
la culture d’entreprise, sur des systèmes de communication à l’échelle de 
l’entreprise, sur des équipes de travail bien encadrées, des taux de salaires 
au-dessus de la moyenne, des arrangements salariaux flexibles et des 
cheminements de carrière individualisés. Ce modèle est influencé par la 
contrainte croissante du marché du travail et de la concurrence qui s’ensuit 
pour des emplois entre les travailleurs et qui s’intensifie.
En cherchant à connaître les raisons qui ont permis au procès de travail 
hautement taylorisé d’éviter la syndicalisation chez Magna, alors que la 
plupart des autres usines de fabrication d’autos au Canada, aux États-Unis 
et au Royaume-Uni sont syndiquées, cet essai soulève un certain nombre 
d’enjeux pour l’avenir du syndicalisme. Dans le modèle de Magna, les 
travailleurs vont se tourner vers la direction plutôt que vers les syndicats 
ou les partis politiques pour se donner « un refuge dans un monde sans 
âme ». Dans la mesure où des variantes du modèle de Magna deviennent 
de plus en plus typiques, cela indique un déclin des caractéristiques clefs 
des relations patronales-syndicales qu’on retrouvait au cœur de la politique 
ouvrière au Canada et ailleurs après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le 
démantèlement actuel de l’accord légitimant le syndicalisme d’après-
guerre et l’affaiblissement de l’autonomie de l’économie nationale qui lui 
servait de fondement ont favorisé l’apparition d’une nouvelle phase de 
« firme-providence » et de syndicalisme d’entreprise. Magna personnifie 
ce modèle d’un retour aux bonnes manières envers les « bons travailleurs ». 
Ce modèle veut remplacer la coercition par la persuasion, les relations du 
travail formelles par les relations humaines, la rémunération sur une base 
collective par un régime de rétribution individualisée.
Le problème principal que pose ce modèle à la politique ouvrière est le 
lieu du pouvoir. Les principales contraintes qui, de plus en plus, viennent 
encadrer la subordination des travailleurs résident dans les pressions de la 
concurrence transnationale, qu’elles soient réelles ou non. Ces contraintes, 
qui se voient renforcies par la présence de l’Accord de libre-échange 
nord-américain, de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce, et d’un éventail 
d’accords commerciaux bilatéraux, ne peuvent être traitées de manière 
efficace sur les lieux mêmes du travail. Tout en s’affichant comme une 
hyper-décentralisation des relations du travail au niveau de l’usine, le 
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modèle de Magna se présente à la fois comme un symptôme et une cause 
d’un effritement de la politique ouvrière. Les racines de la décentralisation 
des relations du travail se trouvaient dans l’accord même d’après-guerre, 
qui était composé d’une multitude de conventions collectives locales dans 
les marchés primaires du travail fortement syndiqués. L’effilochement de 
l’accord est venu renforcir la décentralisation du syndicalisme et a donné 
une impulsion au modèle Magna.
L’impact d’un tel modèle sur la politique ouvrière et le syndicalisme 
est important. Au moment où les identités ouvrières se développent presque 
exclusivement au niveau des usines, des lieux de travail, des groupes de 
travail, il survient une diminution du sens de l’intérêt collectif des travailleurs 
dans les secteurs de l’industrie (la base du syndicalisme d’affaires) et quand 
on considère ces derniers comme classe sociale, c’est la base même d’une 
démocratie sociale et d’autres types de politique ouvrière qui est en cause. 
Un regain des formes antagonistes du syndicalisme ne peut se produire 
seulement et uniquement qu’au niveau de l’entreprise individuelle ou du lieu 
de travail, dans un contexte de restructuration du marché du travail actuel. 
C’est de là qu’une logique de partenariat, de syndicalisme coopératif, de 
modèle sans syndicat, tire son origine.
Les mêmes forces peuvent offrir des conditions favorisant la montée 
éventuelle d’une nouvelle phase de militantisme ouvrier et de syndicalisme 
d’opposition. La nature de la dérégulation croissante de bien des aspects de 
la concurrence du marché fait en sorte que de plus en plus de travailleurs 
vont faire face à une précarité plus grande sur le marché du travail. Encore 
que Magna connaît un certain succès à tenir le syndicat à distance, cela 
est dû à son habileté à offrir un certain degré de sécurité d’emploi et de 
rémunération. Ceci vient entamer l’habileté de l’entreprise à demeurer 
concurrentielle, qui dépend en grande partie des conditions politiques et 
économique au sein de la société, ces conditions échappant au contrôle même 
de l’entreprise. Même à court d’un revirement de l’économie, des stratégies 
politiques pour une nouvelle classe ouvrière peuvent se développer chez 
Magna. Il s’agirait d’une vision alternative qui offrirait au travailleur une 
sécurité d’emploi basée sur les années de service, une attribution de pouvoir 
fondée sur des ententes formelles et un fonds de pension respectable. Dans 
un environnement où la capacité de Magna à soutenir la concurrence devrait 
s’amenuiser, la sécurité d’emploi et les niveaux de salaire des travailleurs 
permanents seraient menacés et la nature fortement à risque du régime de 
partage des bénéfices chez Magna serait également en danger. Dans un tel 
scénario, il peut s’avérer difficile pour Magna de rencontrer les exigences 
de sécurité d’emploi venant des salariés et les mécanismes d’expression 
des travailleurs deviendraient vulnérables. De telles contradictions peuvent 
affaiblir les piliers de la réciprocité patronale-syndicale, qui ont jusqu’ici 
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conforté les travailleurs dans leur dévouement à l’amélioration de la 
productivité et de la qualité chez Magna. Elles peuvent également miner 
son modèle d’évitement du syndicalisme. Alors même que les modèles les 
plus forts de relations du travail au niveau des usines peuvent seulement 
offrir des refuges temporaires de sécurité d’emploi pour les travailleurs, des 
possibilités d’un regain du syndicalisme sont indéniables.
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